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Abstract
Individual diferences in empathy can have positive and negative psychological outcomes. Yet, individual diferences in 
the processing and regulation of empathy-induced emotion have not been fully explored within this dynamic. This study 
was designed to explore whether individual diferences in emotion regulation strategies moderated the efects of empathy 
on common forms of afective distress. Eight hundred and forty four participants completed survey measures of trait empa-
thy, emotion regulation strategies, and symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. Afective empathy typically predicted 
greater afective distress, but the efects on depression and anxiety were ofset when people were efective at reappraising 
their emotions. Cognitive empathy predicted lower distress on average, but this beneicial efect on anxiety and stress was 
absent in those who typically suppressed their emotions. Finally, suppression unexpectedly reduced the depression and 
stress reported for people high in afective empathy. Individual diferences in emotion regulation are an important moderator 
between empathy and psychological health, and thus a useful target for intervention.
Keywords Anxiety · Depression · Emotion regulation · Empathy · Stress
Introduction
The capacity to empathise is fundamental to us as social 
animals. Understanding the anger of a fellow commuter over 
whom we have just spilled our morning cofee acts as a sig-
nal for reparation; feeling and mimicking the joy of a suc-
cessful peer reinforces social bonds; sharing in the sorrow of 
others less fortunate contributes to virtues of altruism, jus-
tice, and fairness. The capacity for empathy is often viewed 
as a positive trait, leading to desirable outcomes, including 
prosocial behaviour and compassion (Singer and Klimecki 
2014). The fuller consequences of empathy, however, are 
multifaceted, and heightened levels of empathy can also have 
negative ramiications. The ability to read other people’s 
emotions may underlie narcissistic exploitation (Wai and 
Tiliopoulos 2012), for example, while empathic distress, via 
emotion contagion, has been associated with greater depres-
sion and reduced psychological wellbeing (Schreiter et al. 
2013).
As a primary part of the emotion-generative process, it 
is unlikely that empathy impacts people’s afective wellbe-
ing in and of itself, but could be hypothesised to have an 
interactive relationship with the subsequent processing and 
regulation of emotion (Eisenberg 2000). Diferent types 
of emotion regulation strategy have been shown to have 
positive and negative relationships with psychological 
wellbeing (Gross and Muñoz 1995). The ability to cog-
nitively reappraise one’s afective states, for example, is 
often linked to positive psychological outcomes, while the 
suppression of emotion is frequently associated with nega-
tive consequences (John and Gross 2004). Less is known, 
however, about how individual diferences in the use of 
emotion regulation techniques may potentiate or compen-
sate for underlying diferences in dispositional empathy 
when predicting psychological outcomes (see Eisenberg 
2000). In this paper, a theoretical premise is explored that 
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individual diferences in emotion regulation may moder-
ate, by enhancing or ofsetting, the observed efects of 
dispositional empathy on symptoms of afective distress.
Empathy
Deinitions of empathy vary, but there is near universal 
consensus for individual diferences in two separable com-
ponents: a “cognitive” aspect, or the ability to recognise, 
understand, and react appropriately to others’ emotional 
states, and an “afective” aspect, or the ability to feel and 
share others’ emotions (Reniers et al. 2011). These two 
facets of empathy have been diferentially linked to peo-
ple’s personalities and interpersonal behaviour (e.g., Wai 
and Tiliopoulos 2012). A recent study measuring afect 
sharing and the cognitive understanding of others’ mental 
states simultaneously provided evidence for the constructs’ 
behavioural and neural independence (Kanske et al. 2016). 
Moreover, in their theoretical model of empathy, Bird and 
Viding (2014) sketched a role for theory of mind that is 
distinct from afect sharing, noting that the former is not 
necessary for, but may contribute to, the latter.
Prior to considering the evidence on empathy and 
afective distress, it is important to emphasise the positive 
social and emotional beneits of empathy for individu-
als and their relationships. Daniel Batson’s longstanding 
“empathy-altruism” hypothesis (Batson 2012) posits that 
empathic concern for others produces the altruistic moti-
vation that underlies subsequent prosocial behaviour. This 
hypothesis has been supported by over three decades of 
empirical work (e.g., Batson et al. 1981, 2003). In her 
review of the ield, Eisenberg (2000) notes the capacity 
for empathic responding to produce either sympathy or 
personal distress, and details a number of studies dem-
onstrating a relationship between empathy/sympathy 
and prosocial behaviour in children and adults. Hofman 
(2008) argues for the role of empathic distress in motivat-
ing helping behaviour, providing it does not become so 
aversive as to represent a state of “empathic overarousal”. 
Finally, a recent fMRI study by Lockwood et al. (2016) 
demonstrated that people higher in trait empathy learned 
more quickly in a task involving the prosocial rewarding 
of others and had more selective responses in a region of 
the brain involved in prosocial learning (the subgenual 
anterior cingulate corex/basal forebrain). This evidence 
and the potential clinical correlates of low levels of cog-
nitive (i.e. autistic spectrum disorder) and afective (i.e. 
psychopathy) empathy (Baron-Cohen 2011) illustrate its 
important role for normative socio-emotional function-
ing. Nonetheless, additional evidence also points towards 
a potential “dark side” of having an empathic capacity, in 
terms of its relationship with afective distress.
Empathy and afective distress
Evidence on the association between trait cognitive 
empathy and afective distress is mixed (e.g., Schreiter 
et al. 2013). Most work has focused on depression, with 
much less on other common experiences, such as anxi-
ety and stress. While some studies have noted a signii-
cant negative relationship between cognitive empathy 
and depression (e.g., Cusi et al. 2011), others have found 
a positive, or no, link (e.g., Dinsdale et al. 2016). In a 
review, Schreiter et al. (2013) concluded that depression 
was more strongly related to reduced cognitive empathy 
than the reverse. Further work has shown that people who 
are socially anxious may be less accurate at theory-of-
mind-related tasks than those with depression or healthy 
controls (Washburn et al. 2016), but opposing indings 
have been published (Tibi-Elhanany and Shamay-Tsoory 
2011). Park et al. (2015) reported a negative correlation 
between a cognitive measure of physician empathy and 
perceived stress. While the literature has inconsistencies, 
on balance cognitive empathy appears positive for psy-
chological health.
Despite its prosocial beneit, the evidence for height-
ened afective empathy and its link to afective distress 
points to a more negative conclusion. Schreiter et  al. 
(2013) identiied a positive association between afective 
empathic stress (i.e., emotion contagion and shared pain) 
and depressive symptoms. Kahn et al. (2017) reported 
a signiicant positive correlation between symptoms of 
anxiety and afective empathy in young people, while 
Kaźmierczak et al. (2013) found signiicant positive corre-
lations between emotional empathy and gender role stress. 
Thus, while afective empathy appears to be related to 
increased psychological distress on average, some research 
has challenged this. For example, in their review, Schreiter 
et al. (2013) noted the absence of an association between 
afective empathic concern and depressive symptoms (see 
Cusi et al. 2011).
One potential explanation for the abovementioned 
inconsistencies is that the relationship between empathy 
and afective distress is not linear. A recent study found a 
signiicant quadratic, but not linear, relationship between 
perspective-taking and depressive symptoms (Tully et al. 
2016), where very low and high levels of perspective-tak-
ing were associated with increased depression. Another 
potential explanation is that the association between empa-
thy and distress depends on a third variable, such as how 
people process, or regulate empathy-induced emotion. 
Tully et al. (2016) showed that a composite of “emotion 
dysregulation” traits (ruminative brooding, ruminative 
pondering, and guilt) moderated a quadratic—not lin-
ear—efect of empathic concern on depression. This work, 
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however, was limited by the size and composition of its 
sample, the analysis of perspective-taking and empathic 
concern in separate models, and the failure to explore the 
efects of empathy and emotion dysregulation on afective 
outcomes beyond depression.
Emotion regulation and afective distress
Emotional experience is the key product of empathy, and 
has been shown to be a temporal antecedent, as well as a 
consequence, of afective distress (e.g., Powell et al. 2013). 
How people respond to empathy-induced emotion is thus 
a key puzzle piece in understanding the temporal unfold-
ing of empathy and distress. Emotion regulation has been 
studied widely in relation to psychological health (Gross 
and Muñoz 1995), and is likely to play a crucial role in 
determining whether empathy-induced emotion has sub-
sequent positive or negative outcomes (Eisenberg 2000; 
Hofman 2008). Two commonly researched emotion regu-
lation strategies include individual diferences in “cog-
nitive reappraisal”, or reimagining stimuli in a way that 
alters its afective impact, and diferences in “expressive 
suppression”, or actively inhibiting emotional expression 
(Gross and John 2003).
Evidence suggests that a capacity to reappraise emotions 
is positive for psychological health (John and Gross 2004). 
Martin and Dahlen (2005) demonstrated negative associa-
tions between cognitive reappraisal and depression, anxi-
ety, and stress. On the other hand, suppressing emotional 
expression has been shown to negatively afect people’s 
wellbeing (John and Gross 2004). Moore et al. (2008) noted 
signiicant associations between expressive suppression and 
PTSD, anxiety, and stress symptoms in those exposed to 
trauma. Haga et al. (2009) reported signiicant links between 
suppression and reduced life satisfaction and increased 
depressed mood.
Accordingly, if emotion regulation is as important to psy-
chological adjustment as the evidence suggests, and empa-
thy is an emotion-generative process, it would follow that 
individual diferences in regulatory approaches should act 
as an important moderator between empathic responses and 
afective distress (Eisenberg 2000). Such knowledge may 
be important in further understanding the mechanisms link-
ing empathy to common forms of distress, and in informing 
interventions designed to disrupt the link between the two. 
No evidence, however, has surfaced to underpin this theo-
retical model. The closest piece of work to date, which found 
a moderating role for proxies of “emotion dysregulation” 
between empathic concern and depressive symptoms, found 
no signiicant moderating role for the emotion regulation 
variables in a smaller sample of psychology students (Tully 
et al. 2016).
Empathy, regulation, and distress: the present study
The current study was designed to test the theoretical model 
that the link between individual diferences in the capacity 
for empathy and symptoms of afective distress may be mod-
erated by common emotion regulation mechanisms. It was 
designed to do so using a large sample and modern linear 
and quadratic regression models.
Based on prior literature (e.g., Schreiter et al. 2013; Tully 
et al. 2016), the following predictions were made regarding 
empathy and afective distress:
(1) Cognitive empathy would have a negative linear asso-
ciation with measures of afective distress; and
(2) Afective empathy would have a positive linear associa-
tion with measures of afective distress.
Based on the signiicant quadratic efect of perspective-
taking on depression observed by Tully et al. (2016), the 
following further prediction was made:
(3) Measures of empathy would have a quadratic associa-
tion with measures of afective distress (i.e., there may 
be a normative or optimal level of empathy associated 
with less afective distress, which was neither too low 
nor too high).
Based on previous indings regarding regulation and dis-
tress (e.g., John and Gross 2004; Martin and Dahlen 2005), 
the following predictions were made:
(4) Reappraisal would have a negative association with 
afective distress; and
(5) Suppression would have a positive association with 
afective distress.
Finally, based on the theoretical arguments exposited 
above, the following predictions were made about the inter-
active efect of empathy and emotion regulation on distress:
(6) Reappraisal would positively moderate the efects of 
empathy on afective distress, either by enhancing the 
positive efects of cognitive empathy and/or negating 
the negative efects of afective empathy; and
(7) Suppression would negatively moderate the efects of 
empathy on afective distress, either negating the posi-
tive efects of cognitive empathy and/or potentiating the 
negative efects of afective empathy.
Additional exploratory analyses tested whether the efects 
of empathy, emotion regulation, and their products difered 
significantly across three different domains of affective 
distress.




Eight hundred and forty-four student volunteers (597 
women) at the host university took part in this study. Par-
ticipants’ ages ranged from 18 to 66 years, with a mean of 
22.27 years (SD = 5.05). The majority were undergraduates 
(n = 555), single (n = 451), and UK nationals (n = 528).
Measures
Demographics
Participants answered background questions on their gen-
der (0 = male, 1 = female), age, student status (0 = under-
graduate, 1 = postgraduate), nationality (0 = UK national, 
1 = international), and relationship status (0 = not in an inter-
personal relationship, 1 = in an interpersonal relationship).
Empathy
Individual diferences in empathy were measured with the 
Questionnaire of Cognitive and Afective Empathy (QCAE; 
Reniers et al. 2011). For each of 31 items, participants rate 
their agreement on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disa-
gree, 4 = strongly agree). Nineteen items measure cognitive 
empathy (with scores from 19 to 76) and 12 items assess 
afective empathy (with scores from 12 to 48), with higher 
scores indicating a higher propensity to empathise. The 
QCAE has displayed good internal reliability and valid-
ity in non-clinical samples (e.g. Reniers et al. 2011), with 
Cronbach’s alphas of α = 0.87 for the cognitive subscale, and 
α = 0.88 for the afective subscale (Lockwood et al. 2014). 
The measure has also been shown to be temporally stable, 
with high test re-test reliability (r = .84) over an average 
duration of 3 weeks (Powell and Roberts 2017). The cogni-
tive and afective empathy subscales have been shown to 
correlate moderately in prior work (r = .31; Reniers et al. 
2011). In this sample, Cronbach’s alphas for the cognitive, 
α = 0.89, and afective, α = 0.78, subscales were good.
Emotion regulation
Diferences in emotion regulation strategies were measured 
with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross 
and John 2003). For each of 10 items, participants indicate 
their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disa-
gree, 7 = strongly agree). Six items measure cognitive reap-
praisal (with scores from 6 to 42) and four items measure 
expressive suppression (with scores from 4 to 28). Higher 
scores indicate greater levels of the constructs. The ERQ 
has been shown to have good construct validity and internal 
consistency in student samples, with average Cronbach’s 
alphas of α = 0.79 for the reappraisal subscale, and α = 0.73 
for the suppression subscale (Gross and John 2003). The 
two subscales have been shown to be independent, with 
an average correlation coeicient close to zero (r = − .01, 
Gross and John 2003). The instrument has also been shown 
to have good test re-test reliability (r = .69) over a duration 
of 3 months (Gross and John 2003). In the present study, the 
reappraisal, α = 0.86, and suppression, α = 0.77, subscales 
demonstrated a good level of internal reliability.
Afective distress
Current symptoms of afective distress were measured using 
the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; 
Lovibond and Lovibond 1993). For each of 21 items, par-
ticipants rate how much the statement has applied to them 
over the past week on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = did not 
apply to me at all, 3 = applied most of the time). Seven 
items assess depression, anxiety, and stress. Scores for each 
subscale range from 0 to 21, and higher scores represent 
greater symptoms. The DASS has excellent validity and 
reliability in non-clinical samples (Lovibond and Lovibond 
1993). Inter-correlations between the DASS subscales have 
been shown to be moderate to high (r = .54 for depression 
and anxiety; r = .56 for depression and stress; and r = .65 
for anxiety and stress; Lovibond and Lovibond 1995). The 
subscales of the DASS-21 appear to have a good standard of 
internal consistency with Cronbach’s alphas of α = 0.88 for 
the depression subscale, α = 0.82 for the anxiety subscale, 
and α = 0.90 for the stress subscale (Henry and Crawford 
2005). As a state measure, the DASS-21 has moderate test 
re-test reliability (rs = .46 for the depression subscale over 
a duration of 12 months; Powell et al. 2013). In the cur-
rent sample, the depression, α = 0.89, anxiety, α = 0.82, and 
stress, α = 0.84, subscales displayed good Cronbach’s alphas.
Procedure
Institutional ethical approval was acquired prior to data col-
lection, and the research was conducted in a manner con-
sistent with the British Psychological Society’s Code of 
Human Research Ethics. Informed consent was obtained as 
a prerequisite to accessing the study measures. As part of 
the sign-up process for a broader study, participants were 
invited through the author’s host institution’s emailing lists 
to take part in an online survey on emotion hosted on Qual-
trics (http://www.qualt rics.com). Participants completed the 
demographic questions, QCAE, ERQ, and DASS-21 in a 
randomised order.
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Data analysis
The distributions of the outcome variables were not Gauss-
ian, but had densities and levels of skewness and kurtosis 
consistent with a beta distribution (Cullen and Frey 1999; 
Delignette-Muller and Dutang 2015; see Figs. S1 and S2 in 
the Supplementary Material). Accordingly, non-parametric 
Spearman’s rho correlations and beta regressions were used 
to model the data (see Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). These 
model the response variable as a proportion of the total score 
possible bounded between (0, 1), and showed a superior it 
to both linear regressions on the original outcome variables, 
or linear regressions on (log, square-root, and reciprocal) 
transformed outcome variables that failed to fully correct 
levels of skewness and kurtosis (the beta models had a con-
siderably lower AIC, see Table S1 in the Supplementary 
Material). The advantages of beta regression over standard 
Gaussian models, when outcome variables deviate from nor-
mal, are noted in Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). To it the 
beta models, the formula cited in Smithson and Verkuilen 
(2006) was used to convert [0, 1] to (0, 1) proportional data.
Separate regression models are presented for the three 
primary outcomes (depression, anxiety, and stress). A con-
irmatory factor analysis on the raw data from the DASS-21 
conirmed that a three-factor solution, χ2(186) = 886.757, 
CFI = 0.916, AIC = 36764.654, RMSEA = 0.067, 
90% CI (0.062, 0.071), had a significantly better fit, 
Δχ2(3) = 673, p < .001, than a reduced one-factor solu-
tion, χ2(189) = 1559.755, CFI = 0.836, AIC = 37431.652, 
RMSEA = 0.093, 90% CI (0.088, 0.097).
All models were estimated hierarchically, testing irst the 
main efects of empathy and emotion regulation on distress, 
and then the moderating efect of emotion regulation, via its 
interaction with empathy. All data were analysed in R 3.2.2 
(R Core Team 2015), using packages itdistrplus (Delignette-
Muller and Dutang 2015), Hmisc (Harrell et al. 2015), psych 
(Revelle 2016), lavaan (Rosseel 2012), betareg (Cribari-Neto 
and Zeileis 2010), and lmtest (Zeileis and Hothorn 2002). 
As beta models use a logit link, estimates are presented as 
odds ratios. To reduce multicollinearity, continuous predic-
tors were standardised prior to analysis. Wald z-tests were 
used to compare the equality of slope parameters across the 
depression, anxiety, and stress models.
Results
Main efects
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for the study var-
iables are in Table 1. People with higher cognitive empathy 
stated they were more likely to reappraise, rs = .31, p < .001, 
and less likely to suppress, rs = − .08, p < .05, emotions. 
Higher trait cognitive empathy was associated with less 
depression, rs = − .16, p < .001, anxiety, rs = − .08, p < .05, 
and stress, rs = − .08, p < .05. People with higher afective 
empathy reported they were less likely to suppress emo-
tions, rs = − .18, p < .001. Higher trait afective empathy was 
associated with greater anxiety, rs = .11, p < .01, and stress, 
rs = .18, p < .001. A greater tendency to reappraise emotion 
was linked to less depression, rs = − .28, p < .001, anxiety, 
rs = − .10, p < .01, and stress, rs = − .23, p < .001, while a 
greater tendency to suppress emotions was associated with 
increased depression, rs = .21, p < .001, anxiety, rs = .18, 
p < .001, and stress, rs = .11, p < .01.
The results of the hierarchical beta regressions are in 
Table 2. Greater cognitive empathy predicted less depres-
sion, OR = 0.89, 95% CI (0.82, 0.96), p = .004, anxi-
ety, OR = 0.91, 95% CI (0.84, 0.98), p = .011, and stress, 
OR = 0.92, 95% CI (0.86, 0.99), p = .025. In addition, cog-
nitive empathy had a signiicant quadratic efect on stress, 
OR = 1.06, 95% CI (1.02, 1.10), p = .003; as the level of 
cognitive empathy increased, reported stress decreased until 
values of cognitive empathy reached > ~ M + 0.75 SD, where 
the relationship with stress became positive. Greater afec-
tive empathy predicted greater depression, OR = 1.15, 95% 
CI (1.07, 1.25), p < .001, anxiety, OR = 1.25, 95% CI (1.16, 
1.34), p < .001, and stress, OR = 1.30, 95% CI (1.21, 1.40), 
p < .001, and had a signiicantly stronger efect on stress than 
depression, z = 2.24, p = .025. A greater tendency to reap-
praise emotions predicted less depression, OR = 0.75, 95% 
CI (0.69, 0.80), p < .001, anxiety, OR = 0.92, 95% CI (0.85, 
0.98), p = .017, and stress, OR = 0.82, 95% CI (0.77, 0.88), 
p < .001. Cognitive reappraisal had signiicantly greater ben-
eicial efects on reported depression, z = − 3.91, p < .001, 
and stress, z = − 2.19, p = .029, than anxiety. A higher ten-
dency to suppress emotions predicted more depression, 
OR = 1.26, 95% CI (1.17, 1.35), p < .001, anxiety, OR = 1.19, 
95% CI (1.11, 1.28), p < .001, and stress, OR = 1.15, 95% CI 
(1.08, 1.24), p < .001.
Moderation efects
Individual diferences in reappraisal signiicantly moderated 
the efect of afective empathy on depression, OR = 0.93, 
95% CI (0.86, 0.99), p = .033, and anxiety, OR = 0.92, 95% 
CI (0.86, 0.98), p = .011. Diferences in suppression signii-
cantly moderated the efect of cognitive empathy on anxi-
ety, OR = 1.14, 95% CI (1.06, 1.22), p < .001, and stress, 
OR = 1.10, 95% CI (1.03, 1.18), p = .006, and the efect of 
afective empathy on stress, OR = 0.91, 95% CI (0.86, 0.98), 
p = .008. Finally, suppression signiicantly moderated quad-
ratic efects of cognitive empathy on anxiety, 1.06, 95% CI 
(1.02, 1.10), p = .003, and afective empathy on depression, 
0.95, 95% CI (0.91, 0.99), p = .029. Suppression had a sig-














Table 1  Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of study variables
N = 844. Correlations represent Spearman’s rho (rs), rank-biseral (rrb), or phi (rΦ) coeicients
† p < .10; *p < .05.; **p < .01; ***p < .001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Gender –
2. Age 0.02 –
3. Nationality −0.03 0.30*** –
4. Postgraduate 0.01 0.58*** 0.22*** –
5. Relationship 0.13*** 0.10* −0.13*** 0.08* –
6. Cognitive empathy 0.14*** 0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.08* –
7. Afective empathy 0.27*** −0.04 −0.12*** −0.04 0.06† 0.26*** –
8. Cognitive reappraisal 0.02 0.09** 0.15*** 0.06† −0.05 0.31*** −0.02 –
9. Expressive suppression −0.23*** −0.05 0.10** −0.02 −0.20*** −0.08* −0.18*** 0.03 –
10. Depression −0.02 −0.11** −0.03 −0.11** −0.09* −0.16*** 0.05 −0.28*** 0.21*** –
11. Anxiety −0.02 −0.07* 0.10** −0.06† −0.09** −0.08* 0.11** −0.10** 0.18*** 0.60*** –
12. Stress 0.06† 0.00 −0.01 −0.05 −0.03 −0.08* 0.18*** −0.23*** 0.11** 0.68*** 0.67*** –
Range 0–1 18–66 0–1 0–1 0–1 21–76 15–48 6–42 4–28 0–21 0–19 0–21
M 0.71 22.27 0.37 0.34 0.47 57.14 33.75 28.87 15.47 4.68 4.35 6.38
SD 0.46 5.05 0.48 0.47 0.5 8.28 5.51 6.39 4.96 4.49 4.04 4.39
Median 1 21 0 0 0 57 34 30 16 3 3 6
IQR 1 4 1 1 1 9 7 8 7 6 5 6
Skew (z-score) −10.81 39.35 6.16 7.88 1.63 −5.14 −2.72 −7.48 −1.39 15.71 14.73 7.76














Table 2  Hierarchical beta regression models
N = 844. Continuous predictors standardised prior to analysis. Odds ratios and CIs calculated by exponentiation of log estimates, inferential tests conducted on the log scale. Wald test compari-
sons: > estimated efect is larger at p < .05; ≥ estimated efect is larger at p < .10
Step 1 Depression (1) Anxiety (2) Stress (3) Wald z-test
OR 95% CI LO 95% CI HI p OR 95% CI LO 95% CI HI p OR 95% CI LO 95% CI HI p Diference
Pseudo R2 = 0.13, logLik = 552.4, p < .001 Pseudo R2 = 0.09, logLik = 627.8, p < .001 Pseudo R2 = 0.10, logLik = 298.4, p < .001
Intercept 0.32 0.22 0.45 .000 0.34 0.24 0.48 .000 0.35 0.25 0.49 .000 Null
Gender (1 = woman) 1.02 0.87 1.21 .783 0.96 0.82 1.13 .625 1.16 1.00 1.35 .058 3 ≥ 2
Age 1.00 0.99 1.02 .825 0.98 0.97 1.00 .038 1.00 0.99 1.02 .806 2 ≥ 3
International (1 = yes) 1.03 0.88 1.20 .742 1.38 1.19 1.60 .000 1.04 0.90 1.20 .598 2 > 1 and 3
Postgraduate (1 = yes) 0.78 0.66 0.92 .003 0.87 0.74 1.02 .089 0.90 0.78 1.05 .190 Null
Relationship (1 = yes) 0.90 0.77 1.04 .139 0.89 0.78 1.03 .124 0.91 0.79 1.04 .154 Null
Cognitive empathy (CE) 0.89 0.82 0.96 .004 0.91 0.84 0.98 .011 0.92 0.86 0.99 .025 Null
Afective empathy (AE) 1.15 1.07 1.25 .000 1.25 1.16 1.34 .000 1.30 1.21 1.40 .000 3 > 1
CE squared  (CE2) 1.01 0.97 1.05 .722 1.03 0.99 1.07 .209 1.06 1.02 1.10 .003 3 ≥ 1
AE squared  (AE2) 1.00 0.95 1.05 .854 1.02 0.97 1.07 .408 1.01 0.96 1.06 .655 Null
Cognitive reappraisal 0.75 0.69 0.80 .000 0.92 0.85 0.98 .017 0.82 0.77 0.88 .000 1 ≥ 3 > 2
Expressive suppression 1.26 1.17 1.35 .000 1.19 1.11 1.28 .000 1.15 1.08 1.24 .000 Null
Step 2 Pseudo R2 = 0.13, logLik = 559.7, 
Δχ2(8) = 14.61, p = .067
Pseudo R2 = 0.12, logLik = 644.5, 
Δχ2(8) = 33.47, p = .000
Pseudo R2 = 0.11, logLik = 305.7, 
Δχ2(8) = 14.72, p = .065
CE × reappraisal 1.05 0.98 1.12 .200 0.97 0.90 1.03 .310 0.97 0.91 1.04 .432 Null
CE × suppression 1.03 0.95 1.11 .481 1.14 1.06 1.22 .000 1.10 1.03 1.18 .006 2 > 1
AE × reappraisal 0.93 0.86 0.99 .033 0.92 0.86 0.98 .011 0.96 0.90 1.03 .282 Null
AE × suppression 0.95 0.89 1.02 .162 0.98 0.92 1.05 .573 0.91 0.86 0.98 .008 Null
CE2 × reappraisal 1.00 0.96 1.04 .984 0.96 0.92 1.00 .053 1.01 0.97 1.05 .545 2 ≥ 3
CE2 × suppression 1.00 0.96 1.04 .919 1.06 1.02 1.10 .003 1.02 0.98 1.06 .352 2 > 1
AE2 × reappraisal 0.97 0.92 1.01 .115 0.97 0.93 1.01 .109 1.00 0.96 1.04 .971 Null
AE2 × suppression 0.95 0.91 0.99 .029 0.96 0.92 1.00 .066 0.99 0.95 1.04 .801 Null
 Motivation and Emotion
1 3
p = .043, and quadratic, z = 1.99, p = .047, efect of cognitive 
empathy on anxiety than depression.
The efects of empathy on the three outcome variables 
at diferent levels of the moderators are presented in Figs. 1 
and 2. Considering irst the linear efects, afective empa-
thy signiicantly predicted greater depression when the ten-
dency to reappraise emotions was low (− 1 SD), OR = 1.22, 
95% CI (1.10, 1.35), p < .001, but not when it was high 
(+ 1 SD), OR = 1.05, 95% CI (0.94, 1.16), p = .416. Afec-
tive empathy had a signiicantly stronger efect on anxi-
ety when reappraisal was low, OR = 1.35, 95% CI (1.22, 
1.50), p < .001, than when it was high, OR = 1.13, 95% 
CI (1.02, 1.26), p = .016. Cognitive empathy signiicantly 
predicted less anxiety when the tendency to suppress emo-
tions was low, OR = 0.80, 95% CI (0.72, 0.89), p < .001, but 
not when suppression was high, OR = 1.04, 95% CI (0.94, 
1.16), p = .401. Cognitive empathy also predicted less stress 
when suppression was low, OR = 0.82, 95% CI (0.74, 0.91), 
p < .001, not when suppression was high, OR = 1.00, 95% 
CI (0.90, 1.10), p = .924. Finally, afective empathy had a 
signiicantly stronger efect on stress when suppression was 
low, OR = 1.42, 95% CI (1.29, 1.57), p < .001, than high, 
OR = 1.19, 95% CI (1.08, 1.32), p < .001.
For the quadratic efects (Fig. 2), afective empathy did 
not have a signiicant quadratic relationship with depression 
when suppression was low, OR = 1.04, 95% CI (0.97, 1.11), 
p = .305, but began approaching signiicance when suppres-
sion was high, OR = 0.94, 95% CI (0.87, 1.00), p = .060. 
Cognitive empathy did not have a quadratic efect on anxiety 
when suppression was low, OR = 0.96, 95% CI (0.90, 1.03), 
p = .238, but had a signiicant quadratic efect when sup-
pression was high, OR = 1.08, 95% CI (1.02, 1.14), p = .006.
Discussion
This paper explored the theoretical model that the efects 
of individual diferences in empathic abilities on common 
forms of afective distress may be moderated by diferences 
in emotion regulation. First, consistent with prediction (1), 
cognitive empathy was negatively related to levels of depres-
sion, anxiety, and stress. This inding adds to prior research 





Simple effects of linear associations between empathy 












Fig. 1  Simple efects (odds ratios) of signiicant linear interactions. 
Low values of the moderator represent − 1 SD, high values repre-
sent + 1 SD. Error bars represent 95% CIs. Bold bars are signiicant at 
p < .05. X-axis is on the log scale. CE cognitive empathy, AE afective 
empathy
Fig. 2  Simple efects of signiicant quadratic interactions. Low val-
ues of the moderator represent − 1 SD, high values represent + 1 SD. 
Slopes graphed between very low (− 2 SD) and very high (+ 2 SD) 
levels of the predictor variable
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which indicates that, on average, greater levels of cognitive 
empathy are linearly associated with reduced depression 
(e.g., Cusi et al. 2011; Schreiter et al. 2013) and other posi-
tive socioemotional outcomes, such as sensitivity to injustice 
for others (Decety and Yoder 2015). Second, and consistent 
with prediction (2), afective empathy was positively related 
to all three forms of afective distress; a inding that sup-
ports previous work suggesting that empathic distress, from 
empathically experiencing the negative emotions of others, 
is often linked to reduced psychological wellbeing (e.g., 
Kahn et al. 2017; Schreiter et al. 2013). The independent 
opposing efects of cognitive and afective empathy on afec-
tive distress are congruent with a wider literature empha-
sising their distinctiveness (e.g., Bird and Viding 2014). 
The results are also consistent with a recent investigation 
demonstrating that cognitive empathy negatively predicted 
behavioural apathy, while afective empathy was a positive 
predictor (Lockwood et al. 2017); motivational apathy has 
close links with the symptoms of afective distress, and 
states of depression in particular.
Of note, there was only marginal support for prediction 
(3), that there may be an optimal or normative level of empa-
thy, neither too low nor too high, in predicting lower levels 
of distress. Replicating the study by Tully et al. (2016), no 
signiicant quadratic efects of afective empathy on distress 
were found. However, the quadratic relationship between 
cognitive empathy and depression observed in Tully et al. 
(2016) failed to replicate here. Instead, a signiicant quad-
ratic efect of cognitive empathy on stress was observed, and 
the size of this efect was marginally signiicantly larger than 
the quadratic efect of cognitive empathy on depression, sug-
gesting that the result previously published may have been 
driven by shared variance between the two constructs. The 
efect of afective empathy on stress was also signiicantly 
larger than its efect on depression, suggesting that empathy 
may have a stronger efect on stress-related outcomes, which 
are more common, than depression (see e.g., Manczak et al. 
2016).
On the basis of past work (e.g., John and Gross 2004), 
predictions (4) and (5) were that higher levels of cogni-
tive reappraisal would be negatively associated, and higher 
levels of expressive suppression would be positively asso-
ciated, with increased distress. The results were consistent 
with these expectations. The ability to reappraise one’s 
emotional states has been linked to adaptive psychologi-
cal outcomes in survey-based (e.g., John and Gross 2004), 
experimental (e.g., Troy et al. 2010), and experiential sam-
pling (e.g., Brans et al. 2013) studies. While similar lev-
els of evidence have tied the suppression of emotion with 
negative consequences (e.g., Brans et al. 2013; Butler et al. 
2003; John and Gross 2004). A novel inding was that the 
protective efect of cognitive reappraisal was marginally 
signiicantly larger for depressive symptoms than stress, 
which was signiicantly larger than its efects on anxiety. 
Thus, the current results reinforce and extend upon what is 
known about the association between emotion regulation 
and psychological wellbeing, while also suggesting that 
certain traits (i.e., the capacity for cognitive reappraisal) 
may be more beneicial for certain types of psychologi-
cal outcomes (i.e., depression) than others (i.e., stress and 
anxiety).
The present results provide new evidence that indi-
vidual diferences in the emotion regulation techniques of 
reappraisal and suppression critically moderate some of 
the associations between empathy and distress (cf., Tully 
et al. 2016). Some support was found for prediction (6); for 
depression and anxiety, the detrimental efects of increased 
afective empathy were ofset when people reported being 
more efective at cognitive reappraisal. This reinforces the 
role of cognitive reappraisal as a protective factor for empa-
thy-induced distress outcomes and is consistent with work 
supporting reappraisal as an adaptive strategy for managing 
negative emotion (e.g., Brans et al. 2013; John and Gross 
2004; Troy et al. 2010). There was no evidence that reap-
praisal signiicantly enhanced the already positive efects 
of cognitive empathy. Similar levels of support were docu-
mented for prediction (7); for anxiety and stress, the beneit 
of greater levels of cognitive empathy was absent in those 
who reported suppressing their emotions, and this moderat-
ing efect was signiicantly larger on anxiety than depres-
sion. For anxiety, suppression was a signiicant moderator 
of the quadratic efect of cognitive empathy, suggesting that 
higher levels of suppression were particularly detrimental to 
those with levels of cognitive empathy higher than or equal 
to the mean. These indings support a wider literature that 
indicates that, on average, suppressing emotion has negative 
psychological ramiications (e.g., Brans et al. 2013; Butler 
et al. 2003; John and Gross 2004). There was no evidence 
that suppression potentiated the positive efects of afective 
empathy on afective distress outcomes.
An unexpected, and unpredicted, inding was that higher 
levels of suppression appeared to have a potentially benei-
cial efect on levels of depression and stress for those higher 
in afective empathy. This challenges the conviction that sup-
pression is always bad, especially in those with heightened 
afectivity (see e.g., Rogier et al. 2017). Indeed, looking 
at the quadratic interaction in Fig. 2, expressive suppres-
sion only began to have a positive moderating efect on the 
link between afective empathy and depression at levels of 
afective empathy above the mean, where contagious afec-
tivity is at its highest. Recent studies have suggested that 
negative outcomes typically associated with expressive sup-
pression may be moderated by gender (Rogier et al. 2017) 
or culture (Soto et al. 2011), and there is a need for more 
research exploring under what conditions suppression could 
be beneicial.
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Overall, the results of the moderation analyses appear 
inconsistent with Tully et al. (2016), but this study uses 
nearly three times the sample size used in that study, 
improved statistical techniques (e.g., modelling the predic-
tors simultaneously), and a mixed sample (rather than an 
exclusive reliance on psychology students), which could 
explain the discrepant indings. It also extends the evidence 
base to consider common forms of afective distress beyond 
depression, with efects that difer signiicantly in magni-
tude. The indings are consistent with complementary work 
that has demonstrated a signiicant moderating efect of 
cognitive reappraisal between afective empathy and proso-
cial tendencies (Lockwood et al. 2014) but suggest that the 
moderating efect may operate diferently depending on the 
outcome(s) of interest.
These indings have implications for emotional interven-
tions designed to reduce or bufer against common forms of 
afective distress, suggesting that the targets of such inter-
ventions may difer depending on people’s empathic traits. 
For people with a higher propensity for afective empathy, 
this evidence suggests that fostering reappraisal is a particu-
larly important quality. Conversely, there was indicative evi-
dence that levels of suppression were not necessarily always 
bad for those exhibiting high levels of afective empathy (see 
e.g., Rogier et al. 2017). On the other hand, for those high in 
cognitive empathy, higher levels of expressive suppression 
appear to nullify otherwise beneicial efects of cognitive 
empathy on anxiety and stress. Accordingly, training in emo-
tion regulation strategies could be targeted based on dispo-
sitional levels of empathy. Interventions to enhance reap-
praisal in the laboratory have been shown to be successful 
(e.g., Miu and Crişan 2011), and to be expandable to applied 
settings (e.g., Halperin et al. 2013). Similarly, techniques are 
available to up- (e.g., Schneider et al. 2013) or down- (e.g., 
Dick et al. 2014) regulate expressive suppression.
Some limitations of the current study should be noted. 
While the sample size is large, it is still a—albeit mixed—
student sample, potentially limiting generalisability to non-
student populations. Second, the work relies on self-report 
data, and diferences between objective and self-report data 
in the association between empathy and depression have 
been noted (Schreiter et al. 2013), yet the work makes a 
unique contribution with a sample size often unachieved 
with objective methods. Third, the questionnaires were 
measured on diferent response scales, potentially artiicially 
reducing variance on the QCAE and DASS-21 (which used 
4-point scales) relative to the ERQ (which used a 7-point 
scale). Although the multi-item nature of the question-
naires should help to reduce the impact of this limitation. 
Fourth, no alpha correction was applied, as procedures such 
as the Bonferroni correction can render analyses extremely 
conservative as a function of the number of tests reported 
(Perneger 1998). Accordingly, the indings reported, and 
particularly the Wald test comparisons, should be consid-
ered exploratory, warranting further conirmation in future 
studies. Finally, the work is cross-sectional, limiting claims 
of directionality. However, the model is based on a strong 
theoretical precedent: individual diferences in empathy pro-
duce diferent emotional experience(s), which are the target 
of emotion regulation strategies, and contribute to afective 
distress as the product of emotional disturbance (Powell 
et al. 2013).
In conclusion, the current study is the irst to provide 
evidence supporting a moderating (i.e. ofsetting) efect of 
individual diferences in two, well-established emotion regu-
lation techniques on the link between empathy and afective 
distress. The indings suggest that if a person is higher in 
afective empathy, reappraisal is a particularly good strategy 
to avoid distressing outcomes, and that suppression may also 
have some utility. If someone is higher in cognitive empathy, 
on the other hand, suppression is consistently a bad regula-
tion strategy and should be discouraged, in order to maxim-
ise beneit to psychological wellbeing.
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